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The New Federalism in Criminal
Procedure Revisited
By DONALD E. WILKES, JR.*
Recognition that the American constitutional system
neither requires nor necessarily prefers that state judges
conform their interpretation of state Constitutions to the
United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the federal
Constitution is particularly significant in light of the chang-
ing philosophy of the Supreme Court.'
I. INTRODUCTION
In a 1974 article published in the Kentucky Law Journal I
examined the growth of a remarkable new trend among some
state courts dissatisfied with Burger Court retrenchments in
the field of criminal procedure.2 These courts, I attempted to
demonstrate, had begun manifesting their disapproval of
Burger Court decisions undermining the accomplishments of
the Warren Court era by extending to criminal suspects state
law-based rights coextensive with or broader than the equiva-
lent rights guaranteed under the Federal Constitution as it had
been or might be interpreted by the Burger Court. The state
cases in which this procedure had been adopted were, I sug-
gested, evasive in the sense that the state courts, by resting
their decisions in whole or in part on issues of state law, had
deliberately circumvented the Burger Court's power to review
state judgments alleged to have expanded a basic right to an
excessive degree.3
Under the adequate state ground doctrine, no state judg-
ment, not even one involving a federal question, will be
reviewed by the Supreme Court of the United States if the
judgment rests on an independent and adequate determination
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Georgia. B.A. 1965, J.D. 1969, Univer-
sity of Florida.
I Mosk, The New States' Rights, 10 CAL. J. LAW ENFORCEMENT 81, 83 (1976).
2 Wilkes, The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure: State Court Evasion of the
Burger Court, 62 Ky. L.J. 421 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Wilkes I].
I Id. at 436-443.
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of state law.' In criminal prosecutions the doctrine traditionally
has been applied to prevent review of convictions where the
defendant has not complied with a state procedural rule requir-
ing the claim of federal right to be raised in a certain manner
or at a certain time. The doctrine also extends, however, to
cases where the prosecution seeks direct review in the Supreme
Court of a state judgment in favor of a claim of substantive
right and the defendant contends that the judgment is founded
on an interpretation of state law. The adequate state ground
doctrine, therefore, prevents Supreme Court review of any
state criminal judgment resting on an interpretation of a right
arising under state law which at a minimum is coextensive with
any corresponding right guaranteed by federal law.
In 1975 I wrote another article on state court evasion of
Burger Court decisions which also appeared in this Journal.7
The second article was devoted largely to an analysis of the
evasion cases which had been decided subsequent to prepara-
tion of the first article.
Since completion of the second article the Burger Court
has continued the methodical demolition of the wall of consti-
tutional protection erected and strengthened by the Warren
Court. During its 1975 term, for example, the Court severely
restricted the application of the fourth amendment exclusion-
ary rule, vastly enlarging the search and seizure power of police
and prosecutorial officials with8 or without9 a search warrant,
Id. at 427-431. The leading case is Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20
Wall.) 590 (1875). Apparently the presence of an adequate state ground divests the
Supreme Court of jurisdiction. Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945).
LId. at 429 n. 47.
Id. at 430-31.
7 Wilkes, More on the New Federalism in Criminal Procedure, 63 Ky. L.J. 873
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Wilkes Ill.
See, e.g., Andresen v. Maryland, 96 S. Ct. 2737 (1976) (warrant clause of fourth
amendment is not violated by issuance of search warrant authorizing seizure of speci-
fied items "together with other fruits, instrumentalities, and evidence of crime at this
[time] unknown.")
' See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 96 S. Ct. 3074 (1976) (border patrol
may, consistent with the fourth amendment, routinely stop automobiles at fixed
checkpoints near the Mexican border in an effort to locate illegal aliens despite an
absence of either warrant or suspicion that automobile stopped contains illegal aliens);
South Dakota v. Opperman, 96 S. Ct. 3092 (1976) (fourth amendment permits police,
without warrant, to conduct an inventory search of the closed glove compartment of a
locked automobile impounded for an ordinary traffic violation); United States v. San-
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and, in language portending the demise of Mapp v. Ohio10 and
Weeks v. United States," the Court broadened the power of a
federal tribunal to admit evidence obtained in violation of the
fourth amendment. 2 Other federal rights watered down during
the 1975 term included the privilege against self-
incrimination, 3 the right to jury trial, 4 the right to obtain dis-
tana, 96 S. Ct. 2406 (1976) (fourth amendment does not prohibit police intending to
enter a private home to make a warrantless arrest from entering the home and effecting
the arrest where the arrestee fled from the doorway into the home on seeing approach-
ing police); United States v. Miller, 96 S. Ct. 1619 (1976) (since depositer had no fourth
amendment interest in bank records, the government prosecutor, without resorting to
a court, could subpoena private bank records and then use them in evidence); United
States v. Watson, 96 S. Ct. 820 (1976) (police may make an arrest without warrant
despite opportunity to obtain one; person under arrest may consent to search without
awareness of right to refuse consent); Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975) (where police
had probable cause to search defendant's car at the time they arrested him in it, they
did not violate fourth amendment when they later searched the automobile at the
police station to which it had been taken).
It should be noted that in the Opperman and White cases the Burger Court
reversed state court judgments for having overextended fourth amendment rights.
20 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
11 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
22 United States v. Janis, 96 S. Ct. 3021 (1976) (evidence seized by state law
enforcement officials in violation of fourth amendment but "in good faith" is admissi-
ble in federal civil action brought by or against the United States). See also Stone v.
Powell, 96 S. Ct. 3037 (1976) (person convicted of crime in state court may not, in
federal habeas corpus proceeding, raise claim that evidence obtained in violation of
fourth amendment was used against him at his state trial unless he was denied oppor-
tunity to litigate the claim in state court system).
22 See, e.g., Andresen v. Maryland, 96 S. Ct. 2737 (1976) (privilege against self-
incrimination does not prevent seizure and use of incriminating business records from
office of defendant); United States v. Mandujano, 96 S. Ct. 1768 (1976) (even though
a person is a "putative" or "virtual" defendant when called before a grand jury, he is
not entitled to be given Miranda warnings prior to questioning); Beckwith v. United
States, 96 S. Ct. 1612 (1976) (Miranda warnings need not be given by agents of Internal
Revenue Service prior to noncustodial interview with taxpayer being investigated for
possible criminal violations); Fisher v. United States, 96 S. Ct. 1569 (1976) (privilege
against self-incrimination does not prevent government from using summons to require
accountant to produce documents relating to preparation of tax returns of a person
under investigation for possible criminal or civil tax liability); Michigan v. Mosley, 423
U.S. 96 (1975) (police may renew custodial interrogation of suspect who has once
exercised his right to remain silent, so long as the suspect's earlier request was "scrupu-
lously honored"). But see Doyle v. Ohio, 96 S. Ct. 2240 (1976) (prosecution may not
impeach a defendant's trial testimony by introducing evidence of his post-arrest si-
lence).
Mosley was another case in which the Burger Court set aside a state court judg-
ment for extending a federal right-this time the privilege against self-incrimination
-beyond the limits thought proper by the Burger Court.
24 See Ludwig v. Massachusetts, 96 S. Ct. 2781 (1976) (right to jury trial is not
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closure of exculpatory evidence known by the prosecution,'5
and the protection against being placed in double jeopardy.' G
As a result of the Burger Court's seemingly inexorable re-
laxation of federal protection for criminal defendants, a num-
ber of state courts have continued to expand basic rights on
state law grounds, thereby utilizing the adequate state ground
doctrine to avoid further review by the Burger Court. Part II
of this article will examine the evasion cases decided since
March 1975 when I completed the research for my second arti-
cle.' 7 The prospects for continued evasion will be assessed in
Part III.
II. RECENT EVASION CASES
The "evasion" cases analyzed below may be divided into
those resting on state grounds alone and those resting on both
federal and state grounds. Three of the cases grounded on state
law alone aimed at avoiding the result reached in prior holdings
of the Burger Court. The other three cases resting solely on
state grounds and all eight cases resting on federal and nonfed-
eral grounds appear to have been framed evasively in order to
eliminate the possiblity that the Burger Court might review the
case and impose a more restrictive interpretation of the defen-
dant's equivalent federal rights.
violated by state procedure whereunder defendant charged with crime punishable by
not more than 5 years imprisonment must first undergo nonjury trial before he can
obtain a trial de novo with a jury). See also Ristaino v. Ross, 96 S. Ct. 1017 (1976)
(black defendant charged with crime of violence against white victim is not entitled
to question prospective jurors concerning possible racial prejudice).
11 See United States v. Agurs, 96 S. Ct. 2392 (1976) (prosecution was not required
to inform defendant, charged with murder, of victim's prior criminal convictions for
assault and carrying a deadly weapon).
16 See United States v. Dinitz, 96 S. Ct. 1075 (1976) (a defendant's request for
mistrial will not ordinarily prevent further prosecution even though it was necessitated
by prosecutorial or judicial error). See also Ludwig v. Massachusetts, 96 S. Ct. 2781
(1976) (Massachusetts procedure requiring defendant, charged with crime to which
right to jury trial attaches, to undergo nonjury trial before he can obtain de novo trial
with jury does not subject defendant at second trial to double jeopardy).
" In the second article, I defined an evasion case as follows:
An "evasion" case has two characteristics. First, it rests on a state-based
right which at a minimum is coextensive with a federal right. Second, the
language of the opinion or the circumstances in which it was delivered make
it apparent that the state court intended to use the adequate state ground
doctrine to avoid Supreme Court review.
Wilkes II, supra note 7, at 873 n. 2.
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A. Cases Based Solely on State Grounds
In Schnechloth v. Bustamonte, 1 1 the Burger Court set forth
its view of the standards to be followed by a federal court in
deciding whether a person has consented to a search otherwise
violative of the fourth amendment warrant requirement. The
Court rejected the petitioner's argument that the standards of
waiver applicable to fair trial rights such as confrontation or
double jeopardy should be extended to fourth amendment
rights.'9 Instead, at least for persons not in custody, the Court
held that voluntariness is the test for determining whether an
allegedly consensual search is valid and that a finding of volun-
tariness may be based on the totality of the circumstances even
though the consent was given in ignorance of the right to with-
hold it.20
Two years later, in State v. Johnson,21 the New Jersey
Supreme Court was presented with the same issue. The defen-
dant, indicted on a narcotics charge, had filed a motion in the
trial court to suppress evidence obtained by the search. At the
hearing on the motion to suppress the state attempted to jus-
tify the search on the basis of consent, and the defendant pre-
sented evidence to show that no consent to search had been
given. The trial judge then granted the motion, in part because
he could not conclude that the person who allegedly had con-
sented to the search had done so with knowledge of her right
to withhold permission to search. Thereafter, on intermediate
appeal, the Superior Court, Appellate Division, reversed the
suppression order "on the ground that the trial judge had ap-
plied improper standards in passing upon the consent issue. '22
On defendant's appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court
recognized that the intermediate appellate court had been cor-
rect in interpreting the Schneckloth test and denying a claim
that the fourth amendment was violated when the police con-
ducted a search authorized by a person unaware of the right to
, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
, Id. at 235-246.
Id. at 231-234. See also United States v. Watson, 96 S. Ct. 820 (1976), in which
the Burger Court went further and held that knowledge of the right to refuse consent
is not a prerequisite for a valid consent search of a person who is in custody.
21 346 A.2d 66 (N.J. 1975).
12 Id. at 67.
1976]
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refuse consent. 23 But this acknowledgment of the Burger
Court's authority to interpret the federal Bill of Rights was
followed immediately by the observation that "each state has
the power to impose higher standards on searches and seizures
under state law than is required by the Federal Constitution. 4
Clearly, the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized its
power to interpret a state-based right more favorably to an
accused than the interpretation given to the corresponding fed-
eral right. The court also recognized, however, that there were
two possible objections to such a procedure in this case. First,
the provision of the New Jersey Constitution forbidding unrea-
sonable search and seizure is practically a duplicate of the
fourth amendment.2 Second, the state provision had never be-
fore "been held to impose higher or different standards than
those called for by the Fourth Amendment. 2
Nevertheless, the court refused to give the provision of the
state constitution on unreasonable search and seizure the inter-
pretation the Burger Court had given the fourth amendment in
Schneckloth. It did not agree with the Burger Court's holding
that a person not in custody may relinquish a right while igno-
rant of his possession of that right.Y For this reason the court
held that consent searches must be judged by waiver standards
and that no waiver can be inferred in the absence of a showing
that the person consenting was aware of his right to withhold
consent:
We conclude that under Art. I, par. 7 of our State Consti-
tution the validity of a consent to a search, even in a non-
custodial situation, must be measured in terms of waiver;
i.e., where the State seeks to justify a search on the basis of
consent it has the burden of showing that the consent was
voluntary, an essential element of which is knowledge of the
right to refuse consent."
The court declined, however, to go even further beyond the
Burger Court and rejected the defendant's claim that in a non-
23 Id.
24 Id.
21 Id. at 68 n. 2.
26 Id.
21 Id. at 68.
2s Id.
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custodial situation the police may not conduct a consent search
without first advising the person whose consent is sought of his
right not to consent. 9
Two state supreme courts recently have joined the Su-
preme Court of Hawaii 0 in retreating from one of the Burger
Court's dilutions of Miranda v. Arizona,31 in which the Warren
Court held that the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination bars the use of statements elicited from a crimi-
nal suspect in police custody unless the suspect was first ad-
vised of and then agreed to waive his rights. In 1971 in Harris
v. New York3" the Burger Court eroded the 1966 Miranda deci-
sion by holding that a voluntary statement obtained in viola-
tion of Miranda may be introduced by the prosecution as a
prior inconsistent statement to impeach the credibility of a
defendant who has taken the stand and testified in his own
behalf. The opinion of Chief Justice Burger for the Court re-
flects none of Miranda's concern about the dehumanizing con-
sequences of custodial interrogation as it is widely practiced by
the police. Moreover, the Court's opinion ignored the vast body
of lower court case law to the contrary,33 misconstrued the rele-
vant precedent of Walder v. United States,34 and refused to do
more than assume that the standards laid down in Miranda
would deter police misconduct.3 5 The Court dismissed as "spec-
ulative" the possibility that permitting the use of statements
obtained in violation of the fifth amendment would encourage
the police to ignore the Miranda requirements.36
The two supreme courts that joined the Hawaii Supreme
Court in avoiding Harris are those in the states of Pennsylvania
and California. 37
Somewhat ironically, the defendant in Commonwealth v.
n Id.
" See State v. Santiago, 492 P.2d 657 (Hawaii 1971).
31 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
401 U.S. 222 (1971).
3 Id. at 231 n. 4 (dissenting opinion of Brennan, J.).
31 347 U.S. 62 (1954). See Dershowitz and Ely, Harris v. New York: Some Anxious
Observations on the Candor and Logic of the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L.J.
1198, 1211-1218 (1971).
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971).
'Id.
37 The Hawaii court's Santiago decision is analyzed in Wilkes I, supra note 2, at
1976]
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Triplett" was a police officer. Other policemen complained
that they saw him remove television sets from a warehouse, and
he was questioned by his superiors at police headquarters. The
questioning was preceded by the warning that under the city
charter the defendant would be fired if he failed to answer any
question put to him. After he had made several incriminating
admissions, the defendant was given the Miranda warnings
and then made additional incriminating statements. The trial
court suppressed the initial set of incriminating remarks be-
cause they had been obtained by compulsion and the subse-
quent incriminating remarks on the ground that despite the
Miranda warning they were the fruit of the first set of admis-
sions. The trial court did, however, under the authority of
Harris, permit the prosecutor to impeach the defendant's trial
testimony by introducing the incriminating statements made
at the police station. The defendant was convicted.
Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, on appeal,
could have avoided reaching the issue of whether to follow
Harris by the simple expedient of finding the defendant's state-
ments to be involuntary, the court felt "it necessary to decide
the issue in terms that will resolve the question in all situa-
tions."3 Stated differently, the court had agreed to decide not
only whether involuntary statements could be used for im-
peachment, but also whether statements obtained in violation
of Miranda could be used to impeach the credibility of a testi-
fying defendant. The court then held:
We are of the opinion that any statement of a defendant
declared inadmissible for any reason by a suppression court
cannot be used for the purpose of impeaching the credibility
of a defendant who elects to testify on his own behalf at
trial.4 0
According to the court, this holding was "premised upon
the logic" that Harris was wrong because it forced a defendant
either to forego his right to testify or to suffer the risk of being
prejudiced by the use of illegally obtained evidence." The
3 341 A.2d 62 (Pa. 1975).
n Id. at 64.
40 Id.
41 Id.
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Burger Court had rejected this logic in Harris.42 In order to
justify its departure from Harris as a matter of law while at the
same time insulating the decision from Burger Court review,
the Pennsylvania court stated specifically that the decision was
based on the provision of the Pennsylvania constitution guar-
anteeing the privilege against self-incrimination and the right
to due process of law.43
A more recent and arguably even more significant case
evading Harris on state grounds is People v. Disbrow,4 in
which the California Supreme Court not only systematically
attacked the implicit and explicit premises of Harris, but also
overruled one of its own previous decisions which had followed
Harris.
At his trial for two homicides the defendant in Disbrow
testified that he was innocent because he had acted in self-
defense. Over objection, but pursuant to Harris, the prosecu-
tion was permitted to attack the defendant's credibility by
introducing prior inconsistent statements the defendant had
made to a police detective. The incriminating statements con-
cededly had been obtained in violation of Miranda because the
detective conducting the interrogation, after advising the de-
fendant of his Miranda rights and hearing the defendant an-
nounce his wish to remain silent and consult an attorney, had
continued the interrogation and persuaded the defendant to
confess by promising that his statements could not be used
against him. 5 Thereafter the defendant was convicted.
The defendant appealed to the California Supreme Court
on the grounds that the impeaching statements had been im-
properly admitted. Despite its prior decision adhering to Harris
in People v. Nudd,15 the court agreed to reconsider the issue of
the admissibility for impeachment of evidence obtained in vio-
lation of Miranda. The court began its reconsideration by ex-
amining the circumstances under which statements that are
inadmissible as substantive evidence because they have been
2 401 U.S. at 225.
" 341 A.2d at 64.
" 545 P.2d 272, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1976).
'5 Apparently the prosecution conceded that Miranda had been violated because
the detective surreptitiously had recorded the interrogation session. Id. at 273, 127 Cal.
Rptr. at 361.
46 524 P.2d 844, 115 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1974).
19761
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illegally obtained can nevertheless be used for impeachment.
It reviewed prior United States Supreme Court cases dealing
with the impeachment use of evidence otherwise inadmissible
under the fourth amendment exclusionary rule and
concluded-quite correctly 47-- that the Burger Court in Harris
had misconstrued Walder, the leading case on the impeach-
ment use of illegally obtained physical evidence." On the basis
of this analysis, the court, unlike the Burger Court, was "not
convinced that Walder supports the proposition that state-
ments elicited in violation of Miranda may generally be used
to impeach."49 A similar conclusion had been reached by Jus-
tice Brennan in his dissenting opinion in Harris."
In addition to determining that the decision in Harris was
not supported by the case law relied on by the Burger Court,
the California Supreme Court expressed concern that contin-
ued reliance on the "Harris-Nudd rule would resurrect the re-
mains of the earlier voluntariness test."5 Miranda had, after
all, been based in part on the difficulties involved in applying
the old voluntariness test under which involuntary confessions
were excluded as violative of due process of law. Since under
Harris, only voluntary statements obtained in violation of
Miranda could be used for impeachment, continued applica-
tion of Harris would result in the courts once again having to
resolve the intractable issue of voluntariness in every case in
which the prosecution sought to impeach the defendant's credi-
bility with a statement procured in violation of Miranda and
"' See note 34 supra.
" 545 P.2d at 275-277, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 363-365. In examining Walder and other
prior federal cases, including Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925), the Califor-
nia court was careful to observe:
Of course, we do not presume to interpret the above-discussed federal deci-
sions in a manner contrary to that established by the United States Supreme
Court as a matter of federal law. We discuss these cases only in order to
determine whether under state law they are persuasive authority for inter-
preting California cases . . . . to furnish justification for an impeachment
exception to the self-incrimination clause of article I, section 15, of the Cali-
fornia Constitution. In short, our decision herein is not based on a different
reading of Agnello- Walder, but rather a different view of the parameters of
the independent state self-incrimination clause.
545 P.2d at 277 n. 9, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 365 n. 9.
" 545 P.2d at 277, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 365.
5' 401 U.S. at 227-229 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
51 545 P.2d at 278, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 366.
[Vol. 64
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claimed by the defendant to be involuntary.2 Thus Harris, the
court felt, tended to lead courts back into "precisely the evi-
dentiary thicket Miranda was designed to avoid. '" 3
Having decided that the Harris rule was consistent with
neither prior federal case law nor the purpose of the Miranda
case, the California court turned to a consideration which it
believed to be the "principal objection" 54 to Harris. Although
Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Harris had not dealt with the
question of whether a jury is capable of distinguishing between
substantive evidence and impeachment evidence, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court simply did not believe that it was possible
for a jury advised of an inculpatory statement secured in viola-
tion of the privilege against self-incrimination to limit its con-
sideration of the statement to the issue of whether it reflected
on the truthfulness of the defendant's testimony. The court
observed:
[There is] considerable potential that a jury, even with the
benefit of a limiting instruction, will view prior inculpatory
statements as substantive evidence of guilt rather than as
merely reflecting on the declarant's veracity. The theory of a
limiting instruction loses meaning in this context. It is to be
recalled that we are here dealing with extrajudicial
inculpatory admissions. To instruct a jury that they are not
to consider expressions of complicity in the charged crime as
evidence that the speaker in fact committed the charged
crime, but only for the purpose of demonstrating that he was
probably lying when he denied committing the charged
crime, would be to require, in the words of Learned Hand, "a
mental gymnastic which is beyond, not only [the jury's]
power, but anybody's else. '55
The California Supreme Court saw two other flaws in
Harris. The Burger Court in Harris had described as "specula-
tive" the possibility that the police might be encouraged to
violate the Miranda rules if they knew that admissions of guilt
obtained in violation of Miranda would be admissible for im-
peachment. The California Supreme Court, based on the facts
of the case before it, disagreed:
52 Id.
5 Id.
" Id. at 279, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 367.
Id. (citation omitted).
1976]
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[T]o permit admissibility leaves little or no incentive for
police to comply with Miranda's requirements. If an officer
may falsify the warning concerning the admissibility of state-
ments, as in the case at bar, other warnings may be similarly
inverted or retracted. The police, for example, may inform an
accused that he has no right to remain silent and no right to
counsel. In a case of notoriety with little independent evi-
dence there may be irresistible pressures on law enforcement
personnel to secure a confession. If it is known that state-
ments elicited in violation of Miranda may nevertheless be
introduced at some point in the trial there would exist no
sanction whatever against the use of overbearing interroga-
tory techniques, at least until the practices approached tradi-
tional levels of coercion."
The California court also thought that admitting illegally ob-
tained evidence, even if only for impeachment, would be con-
trary to "a significant rationale of the exclusionary rule itself"
by infringing on judicial integrity. 7 Both of these objections to
the majority opinion in Harris had been raised by Justice Bren-
nan when he dissented in that case."
Having thus rejected the premises supporting Harris, the
California Supreme Court reversed the judgment of conviction
and arrived at a result contrary to Harris. The possibility that
the Burger Court might review the decision unfavorably and
thereby reinstate the rule of Harris in California was effectively
eliminated by resting the refusal to follow Harris on state con-
stitutional grounds. Perhaps out of concern that the Burger
Court, which has no love for Miranda, might nevertheless set
aside the California judgment by overruling Miranda itself, the
court in addition held the Miranda decision to be required
under the California Constitution. The court's holding was:
We . . . hold that the privilege against self-
incrimination of article I, section 15, of the California Consti-
tution precludes use by the prosecution of any extrajudicial
5 Id.
51 Id. The Burger Court, of course, has indicated that it recognizes no imperative
of judicial integrity compelling it to exclude evidence obtained in violation of either
the fourth amendment, United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974), or the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination, Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433
(1974).
" 401 U.S. at 231-232 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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statement by the defendant, whether inculpatory or exculpa-
tory, either as affirmative evidence or for the purposes of
impeachment, obtained during custodial interrogation in vio-
lation of the standards declared in Miranda and its California
progeny. Accordingly, we overrule Nudd and declare that
Harris is not persuasive authority in any state prosecution in
California. 9
The decisions in Johnson, Triplett, and Disbrow aimed at
evading past Burger Court holdings narrowly interpreted the
scope of federally protected rights. In three other recent evasion
cases also resting solely on issues of state law the emphasis was
on avoiding possible future decisions of the Burger Court which
might further reflect a narrow view of rights guaranteed under
the Federal Constitution. The first of these involved the privi-
lege against self-incrimination. The other two involved the
right to counsel and the protection against cruel and unusual
punishment.
In State v. Deatore0 the defendant was convicted of rob-
bery, and the Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior
Court reversed because the trial judge had permitted the prose-
cution, over objection, to cross-examine the defendant by ask-
ing him about his failure to speak or offer exculpatory evidence
at the time of his arrest. Although the evidence had been ad-
mitted not as substantive proof of guilt but only for impeach-
ment as a prior inconsistent statement, the Appellate Division
reasoned that admitting evidence of silence at or. near the time
of arrest violated the privilege against self-incrimination under
the fifth amendment because it penalized a defendant who
merely invoked his rights.' The prosecution appealed to the
New Jersey Supreme Court.
When the state's appeal reached the New Jersey Supreme
Court the issue of the admissibility under the fifth amendment
of post-arrest statements to impeach the credibility of a crimi-
nal suspect who testifies at trial was also pending in the Burger
Court.2 Resolution of the appeal was therefore delayed while
11 545 P.2d at 280, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 368.
0 358 A.2d 163 (N.J. 1976). See also People v. Moore, 223 N.W.2d 302 (Mich. App.
1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 878 (1975); Commonwealth v. Woods, 312 A.2d 357 (Pa.
1973); People v. Bobo, 212 N.W.2d 190 (Mich. 1973).
" 358 A.2d at 168.
£2 United States v. Hale, cert. granted, 419 U.S. 1045 (1974).
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the New Jersey court waited to see how the Burger Court would
decide the issue. On June 23, 1975, the Burger Court delivered
its judgment, holding that it was unnecessary to reach the fifth
amendment issue because the use of post-arrest statements for
impeachment in a federal court was prohibited under the Su-
preme Court's supervisory power to control federal criminal
proceedings. 3
After reargument and the filing of supplemental briefs on
the applicability of the Burger Court decision, the New Jersey
Supreme Court held that the use of post-arrest silence to im-
peach the credibility of a testifying defendant is impermissible
because it penalizes an accused for exercising his fundamental
right to silence:
[A] defendant is under no obligation to volunteer to the
authorities at the first opportunity the exculpatory story he
later tells at his trial and cannot be penalized directly or
indirectly if he does not .... The privilege of silence is sub-
stantially eroded and reliance upon it unjustifiably penalized
[when the prosecution endeavors to impeach a defendant's
exculpatory testimony through cross examination concerning
the defendant's refusal to talk at the time of his arrest] ."
The decision to prevent the prosecution from assailing the
veracity of a defendant by introducing proof that the defen-
dant's trial testimony was inconsistent with his post-arrest si-
lence was reached "as a matter of state law and policy, as to
which we may impose standards more strict than required by
the Federal Constitution, which standards will control regard-
less of the final outcome of the question in the federal sphere. '6 5
By thus resting its decision on the New Jersey common law
privilege against self-incrimination rather than the fifth
amendment," the court immunized its decision from review by
the Burger Court in the event, which may then have seemed
likely,"7 that the Burger Court should uphold this impeachment
United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171 (1975).
" 358 A.2d at 172.
Id. at 170.
66 New Jersey is the only state in which there is no provision of the state constitu-
tion guaranteeing the privilege against self-incrimination. The privilege exists in the
state by virtue of the common law, as confirmed by a statute. See 358 A.2d at 171.
11 See, e.g., Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S.
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technique over fifth amendment objections." Basing the deci-
sion on the state privilege against self-incrimination also al-
lowed the court to ignore the prosecution's interpretation of the
Harris case, which the court thought inapposite anyway."
In Commonwealth v. Romberger5 the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court reversed the defendant's murder conviction be-
cause the confession introduced at trial had been extracted by
police officers who, in violation of Miranda, failed to inform the
indigent defendant of his right to have counsel furnished free
of charge during the custodial interrogation. Although the in-
terrogation had occurred prior to the Miranda decision, the
Miranda rules were held applicable under Johnson v. New
Jersey7 because the trial had begun after Miranda was de-
cided. Thereafter the Burger Court granted the Common-
wealth's certiorari petition, vacated the judgment, and re-
manded for reconsideration 71 in light of Michigan v. Tucker.73
In that case, where the interrogation also had occurred prior to
the Miranda decision, the Burger Court upheld the admissibil-
ity of the testimony of a witness whose identity was discovered
by the police as a result of an interrogation session which vio-
lated Miranda because the defendant was not advised of his
right to free counsel.
On remand, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reinstated
its judgment of reversal. 74 Tucker was distinguished on the
ground that, unlike the present case, it had not involved the
admissibility of an accused's statements obtained in violation
of Miranda.75 In order to insure that its judgment was not dis-
222 (1971). Subsequently, in 1976, the Burger Court held the impeachment technique
to be violative of the Federal Constitution. See Doyle v. Ohio, 96 S. Ct. 2240 (1976).
6 When the New Jersey Supreme Court decided Deatore it knew that the Burger
Court had agreed to hear two state cases in which the issue of the use of post-arrest
silence for impeachment was again raised. The cases were Doyle v. Ohio, cert. granted,
423 U.S. 823 (1975), and Wood v. Ohio, cert. granted, 423 U.S. 823 (1975). See 358 A.2d
at 168 n. 5.
"' The court said: "We may add that we do not interpret Harris v. New York. ...
to indicate a different result in the situation before us, but, even if it should, we choose
to impose a stricter standard as a matter of state law." 358 A.2d at 172.
11 312 A.2d 353 (Pa. 1973).
7, 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
72 417 U.S. 964 (1974).
73 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
7' Commonwealth v. Romberger, 347 A.2d 460 (Pa. 1975).
71 Id. at 461.
1976]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
turbed again, however, the court further held that the confes-
sion below ought to have been excluded because the defendant
under the Pennsylvania Constitution had a right to be advised
that he was entitled to the presence of appointed counsel before
he was interrogateds.7 Apparently this part of the decision was
placed on state constitutional grounds because, as the Pennsyl-
vania court recognized, in some of the dicta in Tucker the
Burger Court had taken a restrictive view of the right to counsel
prior to preliminary hearing.77
In Romberger the Pennsylvania court based its judgment
partly on state law grounds to avoid unfavorable review if the
Burger Court decided to restrict the pretrial right to counsel.
In Commonwealth v. O'Neal,7 the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court rested its holding on a state ground to assure
that its view of the validity of capital punishment would not
be disturbed by a Burger Court decision rejecting a claim that
the death penalty constitutes a cruel and unusual punishment
in violation of the eighth amendment. In O'Neal the court held
that a Massachusetts statute requiring imposition of a sentence
of death on anyone convicted of rape-murder was unconstitu-
tional under the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.7 At
the time of the decision in O'Neal the Burger Court, as the
Massachusetts court knew, 0 was awaiting reargument in a
North Carolina case raising a virtually identical issue under
federal constitutional law.8'
78 Id. at 464.
Id. at 463-464.
Is 339 N.E.2d 676 (Mass. 1975). See also People ex rel. Rice v. Cunningham, 336
N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 1975).
11 Two justices concluded that the rape-murder statute violated both the provision
of the Declaration of Rights guaranteeing due process of law and the provision prohibit-
ing cruel or unusual punishment. Two other justices concluded that the statute vio-
lated only the former provision. A fifth justice concurred in the result by a process of
statutory construction. Two justices dissented.
See 339 N.E.2d at 690 (concurring opinion of Tauro, C. J.); 339 N.E.2d at 699
(dissenting opinion of Reardon, J.).
1, The North Carolina case was Fowler v. North Carolina, 203 S.E.2d 803, cert.
granted, 419 U.S. 963 (1974). Subsequently, in 1976, the Burger Court held unconstitu-
tional state statutes imposing a mandatory death penalty for the crime of murder.
Woodson v. North Carolina, 96 S. Ct. 2978 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 96 S. Ct. 3001
(1976). The Court upheld the constitutionality of statutes granting juries discretion
whether to impose the death penalty for murder, however. Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S. Ct.
2909 (1976); Proffit v. Florida, 96 S. Ct. 2960 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 96 S. Ct. 2950
(1976).
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B. Cases Based on Federal and State Grounds
In the 5 years since the 1970 term ended, the Burger Court
has decided over a score of cases involving search and seizure
issues but found tangible evidence to have been obtained in
violation of the fourth amendment only three times.2 As a
result, the California Supreme Court, which has not hesitated
to express its disagreement with the Burger Court's diminution
of fourth amendment protections on a number of occasions, has
tended over the past several years to rest an increasing number
of its search and seizure decisions on grounds of federal and
state lawn3 or of state law alone. 4 Three of the most recent
decisions of the California court grounded on issues of both
federal and state law to avoid possible future Burger Court
decisions further diluting the fourth amendment are People v.
Ramey,8 5 Wimberly v. Superior Court,"5 and People v.
Bracamonte.87 In Ramey the court held that both the fourth
amendment and the equivalent provision of the state constitu-
tion prohibited warrantless arrests within a private home in the
absence of exigent circumstances. From the circumstances in
which the case was decided it appears that the California court
grounded its decision on both federal and state law out of con-
cern that the Burger Court eventually would uphold the valid-
ity of such arrests under the fourth amendment. In Wimberly
the court held that police officers had violated the fourth
amendment and the parallel provision of the California consti-
tution when they stopped an automobile on the highway with
52 United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,
422 U.S. 873 (1975); Almedia-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973). The Court
excluded oral admissions of guilt on the grounds that they had been obtained in
violation of the fourth amendment in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975).
" See, e.g., People v. Scott, 546 P.2d 327, 128 Cal. Rptr. 39 (1976); People v.
Krivda, 504 P.2d 457, 105 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1973).
81 See, e.g., People v. Maher, 550 P.2d 1044, 130 Cal. Rptr. 508 (1976); People v.
Longwill, 538 P.2d 753, 123 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1975); People v. Norman, 538 P.2d 237,
123 Cal. Rptr. 109 (1975). But see People v. Harris, 540 P.2d 632, 124 Cal. Rptr. 536
(1975).
- 545 P.2d 1333, 127 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1976).
" 547 P.2d 417, 128 Cal. Rptr. 641 (1976).
540 P.2d 624, 124 Cal. Rptr. 538 (1975).
" At the time the Ramey decision was handed down, the Burger Court was await-
ing oral argument in a case raising a closely related issue. United States v. Santana,
cert. granted, 423 U.S. 890 (1975).
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probable cause to search its interior and proceeded to search
the trunk also. In light of prior Burger Court decisions vesting
the police with the power to conduct warrantless searches of
just about anything with four wheels and an engine," however,
it seems clear that the decision was based on federal and state
grounds because of the California court's concern that the
Burger Court might take a different view of the fourth amend-
ment.
Bracamonte is a much more noteworthy case. There the
defendant, lawfully arrested and reasonably suspected of hav-
ing swallowed illegal drugs to conceal them, was taken to a
hospital where physicians, acting pursuant to the directives of
the arresting officers, forced her despite violent resistance to
swallow an emetic which caused her to regurgitate the contra-
band.
The California court could have held the drugs to be inad-
missible without resorting to state law by relying on Rochin v.
California,90 in which the Vinson Court had held that a forced
stomach-pumping of another drug-swallowing criminal suspect
had violated a "shock the conscience" test and was thus imper-
missible under the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. The decisions of the Burger Court expanding the power
of the police to search and seize do not purport to cast doubt
on the wisdom of Rochin. Some Burger Court decisions weak-
ening fourth amendment protections have even implicitly ap-
proved Rochin.9' Nevertheless, the California court held the
search and seizure in Bracamonte to have been illegal under
both the federal and California constitutional provisions guar-
anteeing due process of law. Bracamonte is therefore a telling
commentary on the California Supreme Court's opinion of the
Burger Court's approach to search and seizure problems. It
demonstrates that the California court is unwilling to assume
that the Burger Court may not overrule Rochin and construe
the Federal Constitution to permit the admission into evidence
of objects seized by means of a search and seizure which shocks
the conscience by its physical brutality.
81 See, e.g., Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S.
433 (1973).
90 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
9, See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973).
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Two other recent evasion cases involving search and
seizure issues deserve brief mention. In Tamez v. State92 the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held violative of the fourth
amendment and the corresponding provision of the state con-
stitution a condition of probation requiring the probationer,
whenever requested by a police officer, to consent to a search
of his person, residence, and vehicle at any time of the day or
night. The decision probably was grounded on both federal and
state law because of past Burger Court decisions enlarging the
consent exception to the fourth amendment requirement of a
search warrant. 3 In State v. Moral' the Louisiana Supreme
Court held unreasonable a search of a student's wallet con-
ducted by a public school principal. Since the language of the
court's opinion did not make plain whether the decision was
based on federal or state grounds, the Burger Court granted the
state's petition for certiorari, vacated, and remanded for con-
sideration of "whether [the] judgment is based upon federal
or state constitutional grounds, or both."95 The Louisiana court
thereupon issued a second opinion stating that its prior deci-
sion was based on state law insofar as it found that the school
principal was an agent of the state, on federal and state law
insofar as it held that the search and seizure was unreasonable,
and on federal law alone insofar as it held that the illegally
obtained evidence had to be suppressed. 6 Over the protests of
three dissenting judges who contended that only federal law
was applicable, the state court then reaffirmed its prior judg-
ment.
The final three recent evasion cases based on both federal
and state grounds dealt with the privilege against self-
incrimination and the right to counsel. The Appellate Court of
Illinois in People v. Wright97 held that both the fifth amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination and the provision of
the Illinois Constitution guaranteeing the privilege barred the
state from impeaching the credibility of a testifying defendant
92 534 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
' See, e.g., United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974); Schneckloth v. Busta-
monte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
307 So.2d 317 (La. 1975).
" Louisiana v. Mora, 423 U.S. 809 (1975).
State v. Mora, 330 So.2d 900 (La. 1976).
97 336 N.E.2d 18 (Ill. App. 1975).
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by offering proof of post-arrest silence. Like the New Jersey
decision in Deatore, 1 the judgment in Wright appears to have
been grounded on state law to guard against the possibility that
the Burger Court might subsequently hold that the use of this
impeachment technique is not repugnant to the federal privi-
lege against self-incrimination.
In the other case involving the privilege against self-
incrimination, State v. Gallagher,99 the Supreme Court of Ohio
held inadmissible a confession obtained by the accused's parole
officer where the parole officer had not first advised the ac-
cused of his Miranda rights. The language in the court's opin-
ion did not specify whether the decision rested on the fifth
amendment, the privilege against self-incrimination guaran-
teed by the Ohio Constitution, or both. The Burger Court
granted the state's petition for certiorari on the issue of whether
Miranda should be extended to include custodial interrogation
conducted by parole officers.' During oral argument, counsel
for the State, replying to a question from Justice Brennan,
acknowledged that the Ohio court had relied on both federal
and state law, whereupon a lengthy discussion took place con-
cerning whether the adequate state ground doctrine precluded
further review in the Supreme Court.'"' Thereafter the Burger
Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for consid-
eration of whether it rested on federal or state grounds, or
both,102 and the Ohio Supreme Court restored its prior judg-
ment, stating:
[1]n reaching our initial decision herein we relied upon the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Con-
stitution and Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution.
Although it is our view that we should reach the same conclu-
sion under the Fourteenth Amendment, we were (and we are)
in any event independently constrained to the result we
reached by the Ohio Constitution." 3
Clearly, Gallagher was decided evasively in order to avoid the
" 358 A.2d 163 (N.J. 1976). See notes 60-69 supra and accompanying text.
gg 313 N.E.2d 396 (Ohio 1974).
"' Ohio v. Gallagher, cert. granted, 420 U.S. 1003 (1975).
o 18 CRIM. L. REP. 4121-4122 (1976).
202 Ohio v. Gallagher, 96 S. Ct. 1438 (1976).
'"3 State v. Gallagher, 348 N.E.2d 336, 338 (Ohio 1976).
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possibility of future Burger Court decisions weakening
Miranda.
Finally, in Pirtle v. State, 04 the Indiana Supreme Court
interpreted the right to counsel clause of the sixth amendment
and the corresponding provision of the Indiana constitution to
guarantee a person in police custody the right, absent waiver,
to the assistance of counsel prior to consenting to a search. Like
the Romberger'5 decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
Pirtle appears to have been based on state law out of concern
that the Burger Court might narrow the federal right to counsel
prior to trial.
II. THE PROSPECTS FOR CONTINUED EVASION
Whether state courts will continue to use state law to vin-
dicate the rights of persons suspected of crime depends to a
great extent on future actions of the Burger Court. Unquestion-
ably a shift away from the Court's law and order approach
might reduce fears that any state judgment upholding a right
on federal grounds alone is in jeopardy of being set aside by the
Burger Court. State courts might then be persuaded to aban-
don their use of the adequate state ground doctrine to protect
their judgments from review. In light of its present composi-
tion, however, it seems unlikely that the Burger Court will
depart from its tradition of construing federal rights narrowly.
The Court's fidelity to the adequate state ground doctrine
will also affect the future of state court evasion. The Court
knows that state courts are declining to adhere to its decisions
while simultaneously using the doctrine to preclude the possi-
bility of unfavorable review."0 8 There are even indications that
the matter has become a private joke among the nine justices
of the high court.' 7 Will the Court therefore attempt to curb
"1 323 N.E.2d 634 (Ind. 1975).
'11 312 A.2d 353 (Pa. 1973). See notes 70-77 supra and accompanying text.
- See United States v. Miller, 96 S. Ct. 1619, 1626 (1976) (dissenting opinion of
Brennan, J.); Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67, 69 (1975) (dissenting opinion of Marshall,
J.); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
,0, During oral argument in Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975), this colloquy
took place between one of the justices-probably Justice Brennan-and the attorney
for the defendant:
QUESTION: Why can't you argue all of this as being contrary to the law
and the constitution of the State of Michigan?
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the evasion by altering the adequate state ground rule? In my
second article I suggested that the decision in Air Pollution
Variance Board v. Western Alfalfa Corp."' might portend a
modification of the rule.'9 In Western Alfalfa the Court re-
viewed a state civil judgment holding that a pollution inspec-
tor's search violated a corporation's right to privacy under the
fourth amendment, as well as its right to due process of law. It
was unclear whether the right to due process of law upheld by
the state court was the right guaranteed under the fourteenth
amendment, the right guaranteed under state law, or both.
Instead of returning the case to the state court for a determina-
tion of whether it rested on a state ground, as would have been
proper,"'0 the Burger Court reversed the judgment on the fourth
amendment issue and remanded the case for a determination
of whether the due process issue rested on federal or state
grounds or both. I now doubt that Western Alfalfa heralded a
change in the adequate state ground doctrine with respect to
evasion cases resting on federal and nonfederal grounds. The
Court's refusal to reach the merits in Louisiana v. Moral" and
Ohio v. Gallagher 2 because it was unsure whether the state
court's decision was based on federal or state law indicates that
the Court probably will not tinker with the rule, even when its
operation prevents the Court from reviewing a judgment al-
leged to have unduly expanded a federal right.
MR. ZIEMBA: I can because we have the same provision in the Michigan
Constitution of 1963 as we have in the Fifth Amendment of the Federal
Constitution, certainly.
QUESTION: Well, you argued the whole thing before.
MR. ZIEMBA: In the Court of Appeals?
QUESTION: Yes.
MR. ZIEMBA: I really did not touch upon-I predicated my entire argu-
ment on the Federal Constitution, I must admit that. I did not mention the
equivalent provision of the Michigan Constitution of 1963, although I could
have. And may I assure this Court that at every opportunity in the future I
shall. [Laughter.]
United States v. Miller, 96 S. Ct. 1619, 1629 n. 4 (1976) (dissenting opinion of Brennan,
J.).
'0' 416 U.S. 861 (1974).
I' See Wilkes I, supra note 7, at 893-894.
"' See California v. Krivda, 409 U.S. 33 (1972). See also Wilkes I, supra note 2,
at 441-442.
11 423 U.S. 809 (1975).
112 96 S. Ct. 1438 (1976).
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I am skeptical, therefore, that the Burger Court will at-
tempt to interfere with state court judgments extending to per-
sons charged with crime state-based rights coextensive with or
greater than the rights guaranteed by federal law. But this does
not mean that state courts may assume that they will be free
of interference from other sources in the event that they elect
to construe rights arising under state law broadly. An evasive
judgment resting on a construction of a right originating in a
state statute or under the common law may be nullified by a
subsequent enactment of the state legislature. Although no in-
stances have been found in which this has actually happened,"3
it remains true that an evasive decision grounded on state non-
constitutional law is subject to being negated whenever there
are enough votes in the legislature to repeal or modify the stat-
ute or rule of common law relied on by the state court. More-
over, an evasion case resting on state constitutional grounds,
while not vulnerable to statutory abrogation, may be nullified
if the decision is sufficiently unpopular to result in a state
constitutional amendment. One of the earliest and most impor-
tant of all evasion cases, People v. Anderson,"' which struck
down capital punishment as a cruel and unusual punishment
in violation of the California state constitution, was overridden
just 9 months later when California voters amended the state
constitution to legalize the death penalty."5 There appear to be
no other instances in which an evasion decision was nullified
by subsequent amendment of the state constitution, although
efforts presently are underway in Massachusetts to amend the
state constitution to permit the death penalty, thereby overrul-
ing the O'Neal case."6
The prospects for continued evasion, therefore, appear to
be bright. While it might be possible for the Burger Court to
curtail some of the evasion by altering the adequate state
ground doctrine, the Court does not appear likely to do so.
Furthermore, while evasion cases are vulnerable to subsequent
"I There are, however, instances in which state legislatures have acted to protect
rights undermined by Burger Court decisions. See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS, ch. 276, § 1
(Supp. 1974).
' 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1972).
"' CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 27.
"' See Boston Sunday Globe, June 6, 1976, at 46, col. 1.
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statutory enactment or constitutional amendment, at present
this threat to continued evasion remains more theoretical than
actual.
IV. CONCLUSION
In response to Burger Court decisions cutting back on the
achievements of the Warren Court and setting aside state
judgments favorably interpreting a federal right, state courts
in the early 1970's began evading the Burger Court by taking a
more generous view of the rights of criminal suspects on the
basis of state law. An examination of state cases recently de-
cided discloses that there has been no lessening of this tend-
ency to avoid the possibility of Burger Court review by resting
the decision in favor of the rights of the accused wholly or
partly on grounds of state law.
I therefore believe that this nation has moved into "a new
period of federalism in criminal procedure in which the state-
based rights of criminal defendants will assume increasing sig-
nificance as federal-based rights play an ever-diminishing
role."11" 7 This era will endure until either of two developments
occurs. The nation's highest Court may regain the will to inter-
pose its authority under the Federal Constitution between the
individual charged with crime and the authorities of govern-
ment arrayed against him, in which event state courts con-
cerned with maintaining a healthy balance between the indi-
vidual and the state will no longer feel it necessary to avoid
Supreme Court review. On the other hand, the state courts
may abandon their more expansive interpretations of basic
rights and submit to Burger Court dilutions of those rights, in
which event the flow of evasion cases will cease. Hopefully the
state courts which have evaded the Burger Court will never
adopt the Burger Court's unduly narrow view of the rights to
which Americans charged with crime are entitled. If they do
not, the state court evasion examined in this and the prior two
articles will continue until once again the Supreme Court of the
United States is a leader rather than a laggard in defining the
scope of the civil liberties possessed by persons brought into
court pursuant to a criminal charge.
"I Wilkes I, supra note 2, at 426.
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